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Supp Article: USSR Farm Min. Reorganization Meets Brez. Policy

No. 12

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F B I S

TRENDS

In Communist Propaganda

SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE:

USSR Farm Ministry Reorganization Meets Brezhnev Policy

Confidential

26 MARCH 1975
(VOL. XXVI, NO. 12)

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MIDDLE EAST

USSR NOTES "FAILURE" OF KISSINGER MISSION, URGES GENEVA TALKS

Moscow has been slow to react to the collapse of Secretary Kissinger's efforts to achieve a second Israeli-Egyptian disengagement agreement, but minimal comment has predictably and unanimously focused on the Geneva conference as the proper approach. One commentary intimated that the Soviet Union was receptive to cooperation with the United States to this end. Radio comment--which began appearing on the 24th, two days after the announcement of the breakdown--laid the blame for the impasse on Israel's "extortionate" demands, justifiably rejected by Egypt. Moscow continued to repeat past criticism of the step-by-step approach, but only one broadcast, in Arabic, explicitly criticized American diplomacy as "ineffectual" by failing to exert the necessary pressure on Israel through withholding of financial and military assistance.

Moscow's central press has still not offered independent comment. PRAVDA correspondents' dispatches on the 25th and 26th, judging from TASS accounts, were confined to selective reporting of Arab reaction and American press comment. The dispatch on the 26th, from the paper's New York correspondent, reflected Moscow's guarded reaction to the White House announcement on the 24th that President Ford had ordered a total re-examination of the United States' Mideast policy. The correspondent attributed to "the U.S. press" the opinion that Secretary Kissinger's tour had ended in "complete failure" with the "direct consequence" that the President had called for a complete reassessment of Mideast policy. The correspondent declined to predict the outcome, saying the future would show what "concrete expression" would result from this "new approach" to the Arab countries and Israel in all fields.

REPORTAGE ON BREAKDOWN,
U.S. POLICY REVIEW

The first monitored Soviet acknowledgment of the breakdown in the Kissinger mission--announced in Jerusalem and Aswan on the

22d--came in a TASS dispatch from Cairo on the morning of the 23d. TASS reported Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi as saying in Aswan that Kissinger's efforts had "suffered a failure" and that Egypt intended to demand an immediate resumption of the Geneva peace conference. In a fuller account of Fahmi's press conference remarks transmitted several hours later, TASS reported him as saying that Egypt would not end the state of war with Israel until a final and complete settlement, and that only then would Israel be recognized in the area. TASS also cited Fahmi as saying that Kissinger's efforts were unsuccessful because of Israel's "recalcitrance."

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The same morning, a short TASS report datelined Washington cited a State Department spokesman as saying that "insurmountable differences" on a "number of key questions" had come to light, that Kissinger was returning to report to the President and Congress, and that President Ford had expressed regret at the "ending" of the mission. Moscow radio's domestic audiences on the 23d heard the news in similar brief reports on the Fahmi statement and the U.S. spokesman's statement.

Subsequent TASS and Moscow radio coverage has been confined chiefly to selective reporting of Arab, U.S. and West European reaction. Thus TASS on the 24th rounded up Western press comment, reporting the New York TIMES as expressing the opinion that U.S. influence in the Middle East might decline. TASS claimed that the U.S. and West European press agreed that it was necessary to convene the Geneva conference. Moscow's domestic service and TASS on the 25th reported on the Arab League council session in Cairo, TASS citing league secretary general Riyad as stating that the United States should completely end its arms supplies to Israel since the arms encouraged Israel's "aggressive policy of expansion." The radio report noted that Syrian and Palestinian delegates had criticized U.S. policy "which does not correspond to the interests of the Arabs."

First acknowledging the announcement of the U.S. policy review, Moscow's domestic service on the 25th briefly noted that President Ford, meeting with congressional leaders, expressed disappointment that Kissinger's mission was "interrupted" and "did not yield any results." The President reported, according to Moscow, that the United States intended to review all aspects of its Mideast policy. Later that day Moscow radio broadcast an assessment by its Washington correspondent, Soltan, who attributed to "local observers" and the press the view that the policy of shuttle diplomacy, "by which the United States hoped to increase its prestige by appearing as sole peacemaker," had failed. As a result, Soltan said, "increasingly loud voices have been heard demanding a critical review" of Washington's Mideast policy. He agreed with the Washington POST that the one remaining hope for peace lay in the Geneva talks.

MOSCOW COMMENT With varying approaches, Moscow's limited amount of radio comment has placed stress on resumption of the Geneva conference and assailed Israel's "insidious designs." The Arabic-language talk, repeated in six subsequent broadcasts, was the only one to criticize the United

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States for failing to pressure Israel, but the chief emphasis was on Israel's "deliberately" unacceptable demands. A commentary in English for North American listeners, by Paul Kuznetsov, also roundly condemned Israel for demanding Arab capitulation to Tel Aviv's "military blackmail."

Kuznetsov's remarks were notable for his intimation of Soviet readiness to cooperate with the United States at Geneva. While he seemed to be mildly chiding Secretary Kissinger for "taking upon himself" the task of negotiating rival claims, he nevertheless pointedly cited the Secretary as saying on his return to Washington that he was ready to work with the parties and "others interested" in promoting peace. Kuznetsov placed this in the Geneva framework by immediately recalling Brezhnev's 18 March Budapest speech on the need for earliest resumption of the Geneva talks. Given good will by all the parties and "not maneuvering for unilateral advantages," Kuznetsov said, such a "constructive approach" could help bring together what are now being referred to as "irreconcilable positions."

A Gerasimov commentary, widely broadcast to European and other audiences, seemed primarily concerned with advancing claims for the efficacy of the Geneva forum. Gerasimov acknowledged that the Geneva conference was only in session for two days, but asserted that it nevertheless "stimulated a positive development" toward settling the crisis, and maintained that it was within the Geneva framework that the initial Sinai and Golan disengagement agreements had been concluded.

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PEKING REVERSES ITSELF ON USSR ROLE IN U.S. MIDEAST IMPASSE

Striking evidence that Peking is not yet prepared to concede that the collapse of Secretary Kissinger's peacemaking efforts in the Middle East signified any real change in the U.S.-Soviet balance of influence there is provided by the unusual PRC media handling of the development. This included the cancellation of NCNA's first report on the breakdown of the Secretary's mission, three hours after it had been transmitted on 24 March, and the subsequent transmission on the 25th of an NCNA commentary which seemed designed to reverse any incorrect impression given by the first canceled report that Soviet influence in the Middle East might have risen at the expense of the United States.

Since the first Middle East disengagement agreements were signed in early 1974 following U.S. mediation efforts there, Peking has portrayed the United States as having the "upper hand" in the competition with the Soviet Union for influence in the region. The first, canceled NCNA report on 24 March dealing with Secretary Kissinger's unsuccessful mediation efforts appeared to depart from this line and to play up Moscow's ability to counteract U.S. diplomacy. It focused on Brezhnev's written messages to Middle Eastern leaders before and during Kissinger's journey and the Soviet leader's call for a return to the Geneva conference negotiations, delivered in his 18 March Budapest speech. This first report went so far as to indicate that the Kissinger mission had failed in large measure because of Moscow's ability to influence the Middle Eastern states against the United States and to secure their support for a return to the Soviet-favored Geneva negotiations.

The 25 March NCNA commentary, by contrast, while acknowledging Soviet-U.S. rivalry on the issue of a Middle East settlement, did not even mention Brezhnev's role and dropped the reference in the first report to superpower contention as a factor in Kissinger's failure. This latter NCNA commentary ascribed the cause of the failed U.S. mediation efforts exclusively to Arab determination not to accept superpower mediation efforts that "connive at Israeli aggression." Moreover, the 25 March article assailed Moscow's Geneva conference peace plan as a veiled Soviet effort to reimpose a "no war, no peace" situation in the Middle East, a criticism not spelled out in the 24 March NCNA report.

Still another difference in the two contrasting NCNA items on the Kissinger mission's failure was evident in the presentation of Egypt's stand in relation to Israel. The earlier, canceled report

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had given a somewhat confused presentation of the Egyptian viewpoint, suggesting erroneously that President as-Sadat would end the state of war with Israel once Tel Aviv withdrew from Egyptian territory. The latter NCNA report characterized Egypt's position in a more generalized way, asserting that it wanted an Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories in the Middle East and favored defending Palestinian national rights.

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INDOCHINA

NEW PRG STATEMENTS HAIL MILITARY GAINS, APPEAL FOR REVOLT

Two government statements issued by the PRG within five days, and two communiques from the People's Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) Command in the past week reflect an intensified Vietnamese communist media campaign to capitalize on current widespread military gains in South Vietnam. There has as yet been no high-level DRV statement, in keeping with Hanoi's customary portrayal of the struggle in the South as one waged by South Vietnamese liberation forces.

The overall thrust of the latest PRG statement, issued on 25 March, is to paint the situation of the South Vietnamese Government and President Nguyen Van Thieu in the bleakest possible terms. It appeals to all categories of South Vietnamese to "rise up" against Thieu and join the PRG's "just cause" to topple Thieu, offering them a variety of rewards and incentives to do so. The new statement essentially restates the basic appeals issued in connection with the communist offensives in 1972 and 1968, with timely modification and more specific embellishments to attract support to the PRG side. The earlier PRG statement, issued on 21 March, exultantly hailed the "great victories" in "uprisings and attacks" throughout the South, detailed the extent of the communist military takeovers, urged southerners to join the PLAF side, and reiterated standard PRG claims of the "legitimate right" of the PLAF and the people to resort to military action. PLAF Command communiques issued on the 20th and 26th, respectively, dealt with military victories in South Vietnam's Highland provinces and the fall of Quang Tri, and the "liberation" of Hue on 26 March.

Prompt warnings against possible U.S. attempts to become reinvolved in Vietnam, including acknowledgment of the just-announced visit to Saigon by U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Weyand, were contained in PRG and DRV foreign ministry spokesmen's statements issued on the 26th. Aside from another DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement of the 22d, denying U.S. State Department claims that North Vietnamese forces had moved south for a "major offensive," Hanoi media have limited their response to lower-level comment such as NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorials hailing the military victories by the PLAF.

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DENIALS OF "MAJOR OFFENSIVE" Although the PLAF Command communique in one instance referred to an "offensive and uprising of the people," the latest widespread military initiatives by the communist forces in the South have not been elsewhere characterized as a military offensive in either the PKG statements or PLAF communiqués. This pattern has been repeated in subsequent propaganda, which has frequently used the terms "attacks" and "offensive" interchangeably in describing the fighting but carefully avoided defining it as a "major" or "large" offensive.

Hanoi's own sensitivity on this issue was clearly revealed in a 22 March DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement protesting what it said was a U.S. State Department claim that North Vietnam had moved a "large force to South Vietnam" in order to carry out a "major offensive." The spokesman's statement described the assertion as part of the "repeated slanders" uttered by the Ford Administration against the DRV and described it as an "old maneuver" to "mislead public opinion." Similarly, a 20 March Liberation Radio broadcast, commenting on Thieu's speech earlier that same day, took strong exception to what was described as his "insolently slandering the DRV government for concentrating its forces to launch a general offensive." By contrast, during the 1968 Tet offensive and the 1972 March offensive, Hanoi and PRG media had shown no hesitancy in describing the fighting as a "general offensive" or a "big offensive."

WARNINGS AGAINST U.S. INVOLVEMENT The DRV and PRG have both responded to the dispatch of U.S. Army Chief of Staff Weyand to South Vietnam by President Ford, with protests contained in foreign ministry spokesmen's statements issued on 26 March. The routinely worded DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement was pegged specifically to the Weyand trip and the dispatch of the U.S. aircraft carrier "Hancock" to Indochina waters. According to the DRV statement, these actions constitute "blatant violations" of the Paris agreement. The PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement was more broadranging: while denouncing the Weyand trip and the sending of the "Hancock" to the "waters of South Vietnam," it was primarily concerned with the alleged "forced" evacuation of refugees from areas no longer under GVN control. The PRG Foreign Ministry statement "vehemently condemned" these "criminal" acts of the United States and Saigon and urged that U.S. "involvement and interference" in South Vietnam be ended.

In other Vietnamese communist comment on U.S. "involvement" in Vietnam, a 25 March Hanoi radio commentary voiced strong disagreement with remarks reportedly made by President Ford on 23 March in Los Angeles. According to the commentary, the President "openly

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acknowledged the total bankruptcy of the Nixon Doctrine" when he allegedly speculated about whether the United States should maintain a presence in Southeast Asia. The commentary was especially critical of what it termed President Ford's "blaming the present rapid and disastrous decline of the Saigon puppet armed forces and people on the failure of the U.S. Congress to appropriate the \$300 million in supplemental military aid" Such "shifting of the blame" only serves to further expose the "critical and embroiled situation in the internal ranks of the United States," the commentary averred.

PRG 25 MARCH STATEMENT The 25 March PRG statement designed to win over GVN personnel to the PRG side opened with the now standard charges of alleged U.S. perfidy in "sabotaging" the Paris agreement and an extremely gloomy depiction of Thieu's current status, which it described as a "comprehensive crisis" and an "unprecedentedly isolated and disadvantageous position" from which he will "certainly be unable to avoid complete collapse." In assessing the PRG situation the statement, by contrast, was glowingly optimistic and claimed that "no reactionary force can check our people's advance toward final victory" and that the "strong victorious and ascending position obviously belongs to our people." Like the 8 October and 21 March PRG statements, the latest one demanded the overthrow of Thieu and his replacement by a government willing to implement the Paris agreement, but it stopped short of any mention of possible negotiations.

The seven-point policy set forth in the statement of the 25th is essentially an appeal for personnel associated with the Saigon government--"troops, officers, policemen and puppet personnel, and those who cherish peace"--to revolt, defect, or cooperate with the PRG and is strongly reminiscent of similar appeals issued during the 1968 Tet offensive and on 25 January 1972, some two months prior to the March 1972 offensive.* The statement categorized personnel living under the Saigon regime and suggested various roles they might play to "frustrate the U.S.-puppet clique's schemes." For example, "every Vietnamese" was exhorted to obstruct "forcible conscription and troop upgrading and forcible relocation" and was promised the "wholehearted assistance of the revolutionary administration." The statement asserted that those who want to join the "revolution" would be given "suitable" assignments and those who want to go to "areas under the control of the revolutionary administration" would receive assistance in earning their living.

* For background on the previous appeals, see the TRENDS of 2 February 1972, pages 21-23.

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"Officers, generals, and high ranking officials" were also enjoined to change their allegiance and, depending on the circumstances of their defection, were likewise promised they would be allowed to retain their rank, given "important" jobs, and even considered for promotion. Although the 1968 and 1972 appeals made similar pitches to ARVN officers, they were somewhat less magnanimous and detailed, and limited offers of future assignment to "appropriate posts." Prisoners of war, the statement declared, would be allowed to return to their families or, if they wish, to "participate in revolutionary tasks." Those prisoners of war who have committed "crimes" and repent were urged to perform "meritorious deeds to make up for these crimes."

PRG 21 MARCH STATEMENT The 21 March PRG Government statement was optimistic in its appraisal of the current military situation in the South. Describing the battlefield successes as "very great and strategically significant victories," it portrayed the United States and Thieu as having suffered "serious defeats" and being driven into a "defeated, passive and unprecedentedly grave and irremediable decline." The government statement, however, went to greater length than the 20 March PLAF communique in justifying the latest military action as "punishment" for the United States and Thieu, who have "embarked ever more extensively on their criminal path." While the statement did present a list of "dark schemes and criminal acts" allegedly perpetrated by the United States and Thieu in the South, the charges were a rehash of complaints customarily contained in Vietnamese communist propaganda.

In presenting possible solutions to the present impasse in the South, the statement went on record as backing the stand taken by the 8 October 1974 PRG statement and repeated verbatim the latter's demands for a complete termination of U.S. "involvement" in South Vietnam and its call to topple Thieu to make way for an administration willing to implement the Paris agreement, in which circumstances the PRG would be ready to negotiate "with a view to promptly solving the problem of South Vietnam."*

* For a discussion of the 8 October 1974 PRG statement, see the TRENDS of 9 October 1974, pages 11-12.

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PLAF COMMUNIQUE
OF 20, 26 MARCH

The 20 March PLAF Command communique was the first acknowledgment in Vietnamese communist media that South Vietnam's highland provinces had been captured and that Quang Tri had fallen. According to the communique, "the provinces of Kontum, Gia Lai (Pleiku), Darlac, Phu Bon, and Quang Tri, with all their provincial capitals" had been "completely liberated." In a step-by-step account of the communist military success, the communique told of the "concerted action" to cut highways 14, 19, and 21 and "lay a snare for the Saigon army" and of the taking of Ban Me Thuot, the capture of which caused "the whole defense system of the enemy in the region to begin to rock." Thus, the communique averred, "frightened at the PLAF's assaults and the people's uprisings, the Saigon forces stationed in these areas took flight." Asserting that the PLAF and people "are now stronger than ever" and declaring their determination to "scrupulously" implement the Paris agreement and punish "U.S. imperialism and its lackeys," the communique concluded by urging ARVN officers and men to "join the people in their offensive and uprising to win many more victories" and to "rally to the people as soon as they can."

A 26 March PLAF High Command communique, as reported by VNA, announced the "complete liberation" of Hue city that afternoon after what was described as a four-day campaign involving "uprisings by the people," as well as the "liberation" of Thua Thien Province. The achievements were described as "a very great strategic and political victory" of the PLAF.

EARLY HANOI TREATMENT

Although the PRG statements and PLAF communiques have not yet received the support of authoritative DRV Government comment, the communique was welcomed in a 21 March NHAN DAN editorial which described the "glorious victories of our compatriots and combatants" in the South in the same glowing terms as the communique and stated that "our victory this time is the result of a change in the balance of forces created by past victories." Likewise, a 22 March editorial in the army newspaper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, in discussing the PRG statement, claimed the argument of the "Thieu clique" that the retreat from the highlands and Quang Tri was a "strategic redeployment of forces" and a "joke to everyone who has witnessed the retreat of the defeated mercenary army."

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PRG, DRV MEDIA STRESS ARVN DISARRAY, PREDICT "COLLAPSE"

The strategic significance of the communist takeover of the Central Highlands has been given prominent play in Hanoi and PRG media, with repeated stress on the speed of the action. By the same token, the media have depicted the resulting GVN situation in the most pessimistic terms, alleging massive losses by the ARVN and claiming that the Saigon administration is "rushing headlong toward serious collapse." In an apparent effort to bolster this picture of impending GVN doom, Hanoi and Liberation radios have been quick to replay Western reports on the latest rumors of possible Saigon coups and attempts on President Thieu's life. At the same time the radios have repeatedly issued direct appeals for soldiers and civilians under the GVN administration to switch their allegiance to the communists.

Observing that these are "happy and exuberant" times, a 21 March editorial in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN entitled "Victories of Strategic Significance" boasted that "in just over 15 days an immense expanse of land, one-fourth of the South, has been completely liberated . . . , with a population of nearly one million people . . . and is now under the control of the revolution." The editorial contended that possession of this "new strategic terrain" gave the "southern revolution" a favorable new battle position from which it could strengthen and develop itself "politically, economically, and militarily." On the other hand, the editorial declared that the reduced area now under Thieu's control would drive his "clique" into a "more divided, encircled, isolated, critical, defeated, and collapsing position." A 22 March Liberation Radio commentary on the communist takeover of the highlands--which similarly noted the "high military, political, and economic value" of the area--went back seven years in recalling that "attacks and uprisings" by the people of Ban Me Thuot had "marked the opening of the all-South general offensive and uprising at the beginning of spring 1968."

ARVN LOSSES, Claims of large-scale military losses for
IMPACT ON MORALE the ARVN have been repeatedly featured by
 Vietnamese communist media during the current
offensive, as had been the case during previous major engagements,
including the communist general offensive starting in March 1972.
Thus, the 21 March QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial alleged that "a
major part of the puppet army--one division, four infantry and
armored regiments, and dozens of battalions, numbering nearly
40,000--has been wiped out or completely disbanded." A 25 March
Liberation Press Agency report on the fighting was even more

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specific: it reported, for example, that "from 5 to 23 March the armed forces and people in the Central Highlands put out of action nearly 170,000 Saigon troops, including 40,000 regular troops, and 80,000 'civil guards,' militiamen, and 'popular defense' members, wiped out the 23d Infantry division, five multibattalion ranger units, four tank and armored regiments, eight battalions, six companies, and 23 artillery platoons, knocked out and dissolved three multibattalion units, 24 battalions, 36 'civil guard' companies, and 48 'popular defense' platoons"

Media treatment of the March 1972 offensive not only had played up accounts of tremendous ARVN losses but also had exploited the claimed capture or defection of ARVN officers, describing the circumstances in detail and broadcasting purported statements by the captives. The latter tactic has not been employed thus far in connection with the current fighting, and communist media have instead been reporting on high-ranking officers supposedly killed or wounded in battle. For example, Liberation radio on the 23d broadcast a report that the commander of the ARVN 23d division, Major General Le Trung Tuong, was "seriously wounded" while directing his troops from a helicopter and that Colonel Vu The Quang, Tuong's replacement, was shot to death a short time later in Ban Me Thuot.

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CAMBODIAN FRONT MARKS FIFTH ANNIVERSARY, REJECTS COMPROMISE

Celebrations marking the fifth anniversary of establishment of the Cambodian insurgent Front (NUFC) on 23 March 1970 have prompted an outpouring of authoritative Front statements reaffirming determined opposition to a compromise settlement and expressing strong confidence that an insurgent military victory is near. Prince Sihanouk, speaking in Peking on 22 March, offered the first, negative and authoritative Front response to Lon Nol's plans--reported by Western agencies--to leave Cambodia and permit the Phnom Penh regime to negotiate a compromise agreement with the insurgents. Sihanouk rejected this as a "despicable maneuver" and reemphasized the Front's refusal to accept any coalition government proposals. Peking, Hanoi and Moscow comment on the anniversary has played up optimistic assessments of Front success and offered effusive testimonials to solidarity with the insurgents.

FRONT STANCE Speaking at an anniversary reception hosted by the RGNU ambassador in Peking, Sihanouk denounced recent reports of alleged U.S. efforts to remove Lon Nol so that the newly formed Phnom Penh cabinet under Prime Minister Long Boret could negotiate a compromise with the Front. Sihanouk affirmed that the RGNU was "the sole legal government of Cambodia as a whole" and that it would never divest itself of its "legitimacy so as to dissolve itself in a 'coalition government'--a poisoned dish cooked up by imperialist-neocolonialist devils." Sihanouk also criticized the new Phnom Penh cabinet, offered a notably sanguine assessment of Front prospects for final victory "in the coming weeks," and denounced President Ford's 17 March remarks in South Bend as a justification for a continuing U.S. doctrine of global intervention.

Sihanouk's tough stance on a compromise settlement was echoed by the insurgent leaders in Cambodia in a 25 March RGNU press communique reporting on an RGNU cabinet meeting that day chaired by insurgent military chief and RGNU Deputy Prime Minister Khieu Samphan. The communique, broadcast by the Voice of the NUFC of Phnom Penh on the 26th, said that the Front "categorically rejects all negotiation maneuvers of U.S. imperialism and its lackeys," and warned Phnom Penh functionaries against participating in U.S. "diplomatic schemes of deceitful negotiations." It reaffirmed the Front's total opposition to the seven top Phnom Penh leaders, while promising leniency to other officials who stopped supporting the Lon Nol regime. Other authoritative Front comment--including a 22 March RGNU Government statement on the anniversary and statements by Khieu Samphan on 20 and 23 March marking recent military successes--underlined the

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insurgents' belief that Phnom Penh's "doomsday has come" and affirmed that peace would be restored if U.S. interference were ended, allowing the Front to settle Cambodian affairs.

PEKING Peking followed its past practice in marking the NUFC anniversary, with the usual leaders' message, leadership turnout at the Cambodian ambassador's reception and a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, but Chinese comment on the date placed more stress on Sino-Cambodian solidarity than it did last year. Chinese attendance at the 22 March RGNU reception was at a higher level than last year's, reflecting the fact that Sihanouk was attending the RGNU ambassador's reception for the first time since 1972* as well as the quinquennial nature of this year's anniversary. PRC Vice Premiers Teng Hsiao-ping and Chi Teng-kuei led the turnout and Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua addressed the conclave, whereas last year's turnout was led by Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien and was addressed by Vice Foreign Minister Han Nien-lung. Also reflecting Peking's recent practice on quinquennial dates, NCNA transmitted the Chinese leaders' message--signed this year by NPC Chairman Chu Teh and Premier Chou En-lai and addressed to Sihanouk and RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth--in contrast to last year, when the message was broadcast only by Peking radio's services beamed to Cambodia.

Chinese comment on the date included pledges--in the leaders' message and in Chiao Kuan-hua's remarks--that it was China's "bounden internationalist duty" to support the Cambodian struggle, evidence of Sino-Cambodian solidarity that was absent last year. In contrast to Han Nien-lung's vague "wish" in 1974 for a complete Front victory, Chiao Kuan-hua cited Mao's authority in pledging to give "strong backing and always unite together, fight together and win victory together with you." The PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial reaffirmed last year's claim that China and Cambodia are of the "same family," but it added a citation from Mao's 20 May 1970 statement in support of Cambodia and the observation that Sino-Cambodian unity and friendship "have been further consolidated and developed."

* In 1974 Sihanouk marked the anniversary at a reception in Canton, while in 1973 he attended an anniversary reception in the Cambodian "liberated zone."

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Peking duly backed Sihanouk as "head of state" and praised Front military victories in noting that the fall of Phnom Penh "is not far off." The Chinese made only passing reference to U.S. supply and negotiation efforts, in contrast to continuing stern Front criticism and Chinese rebukes of U.S. Government efforts earlier this month.* A 22 March NCNA commentary on the anniversary reiterated Peking's recent criticism of Soviet intentions in Cambodia, warning the Front to beware not only of the United States but of "all sorts" of enemies in the days ahead.

HANOI The North Vietnamese also gave higher level treatment to this year's anniversary, their comment showing evidence of a marked improvement in Vietnamese-Cambodian relations over the past year. DRV leadership attendance at the 22 March Cambodian ambassador's reception in Hanoi included Premier Pham Van Dong, Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap, and Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi, and Pham Van Dong addressed the conclave. In 1974 Le Thanh Nghi was the top DRV leader present, and he spoke at that meeting. Also this year Le Duc Tho attended a 21 March reception hosted by the Vietnam Fatherland Front and the Vietnamese-Cambodian Friendship association--a reception that was not noted in 1974.

The usual DRV leader's message, signed by President Ton Duc Thang and Pham Van Dong, was considerably warmer than last year's, noting that Hanoi and the Front "have come to understand each other more and more" and that "their mutual respect and assistance is increasing." The message was replete with pledges of Vietnamese "assistance" to Cambodia, in contrast to 1974 when DRV aid to Cambodia was only mentioned in passing by a NHAN DAN editorial. Giap's 22 March message to Khieu Samphan marking this year's anniversary was also warmer than last year's, pledging that the DRV people and armed forces would do "their utmost" to consolidate the militant solidarity between them. The customary NHAN DAN editorial on 23 March hailed the "new development" of the Cambodian struggle and the futility of U.S. efforts to save the Phnom Penh regime from total collapse.

MOSCOW In line with recent Soviet efforts to upgrade ties with the Cambodian Front, President Nikolay Podgorny's message of anniversary congratulations to Sihanouk went beyond last year's in expressing his confidence that "existing relations

* For background on recent Peking comment on U.S. involvement in Cambodia, see the TRENDS of 12 March 1975, pages 13-14.

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of friendship and cooperation" between the Soviet Union and RGNU would be further developed and strengthened. The 23 March issue of PRAVDA also affirmed the vigorous support of the Soviet Union for RGNU, headed by Sihanouk, as the "sole, lawful representative of the Cambodian people."

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HUNGARY

CONGRESS STATEMENTS, PERSONNEL SHIFTS STRENGTHEN ORTHODOX TREND

The growing trend toward orthodoxy in the Hungarian communist party, noticeable since the MSZMP's self-critical plenum of November 1972, was strengthened in party First Secretary Kadar's opening report, the final resolution, and the personnel changes announced at the Hungarian party's 11th congress of 17-22 March. While conceding that the liberal New Economic Management system instituted in 1968 had brought needed reforms, Kadar made it clear that there would be tighter centralized control of economic management and planning, stressing also the need for stronger assertion of the party's leading role and demanding greater conformity in the ideological and cultural realm.* These points, as well as Kadar's endorsement of detente, international communist party conferences, and condemnation of "Maoism," were echoed in the congress' final resolution--an updating of the "guiding principles" for the upcoming congress which had been published in December. The congress also dropped three veteran liberals--Nyers, Feher, and Kallai--from the Politburo and added four orthodox party functionaries to that body, but in his summing-up speech at the congress on the 21st, Kadar rejected alleged Western conjectures that the MSZMP was "hardening" its line and moving toward a "dictatorship."

The congress was attended by delegates from some 30 foreign parties, including party chiefs Brezhnev, Gierek, Honecker, Husak, and Zhivkov and Politburo-level figures from Romania, Yugoslavia, Cuba, Mongolia, the DRV, and the DPRK.

ECONOMY, IDEOLOGY

At the outset of his main congress report on the 17th, Kadar highlighted the fact that the November 1972 plenum had roundly criticized the New Economic Management system and had pointed to the need for strengthening party control. He went on to urge that such central bodies as the National Planning Office exercise their "rights" and not hesitate to intervene in management and planning. Prefacing these remarks, Kadar declared that "we cannot put the blame on the international economic situation for shortcomings in our own economic work."

* The international communist relations aspect of the congress speeches by Kadar and Brezhnev were discussed in the TRENDS of 19 March.

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Regarding the party's leading role, the MSZMP leader pointed to "violations" of the principle of democratic centralism and complained that "binding" party resolutions were not always properly enforced. He went on to denounce "arbitrary, subjective," rather than uniform, interpretation of party decisions, noting that even responsible officials were guilty of such self-assertion. Dramatizing the urgency of strengthened party unity, Kadar announced that a year-long exchange of party membership cards would begin in 1975. Such a purge of the party membership rolls had been carried out in recent years in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, and the USSR.

On the subjects of ideology and culture, Kadar insisted that the Hungarian party's traditionally lenient stance on artistic creativity did not mean "acquiescence or a compromise of principle." Ideological debates between communists and noncommunists in the country, he added, must be "on the principled basis of Marxism-Leninism." Warning against the softening activities of bourgeois propaganda aimed at fomenting nationalism, Kadar said what Brezhnev and the other orthodox party leaders in attendance wanted to hear in stressing the need for ideological cooperation with the fraternal parties.

PERSONNEL SHIFTS The party congress was the occasion for the removal from the Politburo of three veteran liberals who had been in eclipse since the landmark November 1972 plenum: Rezso Nyers, the chief architect of the New Economic Management system, who had already been removed as party secretary in charge of the economy at the March 1974 plenum; Lajos Feher, who had been retained as a Politburo member at the March 1974 plenum but "retired" from all active party functions; and Gyula Kallai, who had heretofore retained only the figurehead post of chairman of the Patriotic People's Front (PPF). Presumably to preserve a facade of balance, a fourth liberal figure, Gyorgy Aczel, was retained on the Politburo. Aczel had been removed as party secretary in charge of culture and given the less powerful post of deputy premier at the March 1974 plenum.

Named to the Politburo and enlarging its membership from 12 to 13 were four orthodox party functionaries: Gyorgy Lazar, Hungary's permanent CEMA representative; Laszlo Marothy, first secretary of the Hungarian Communist Youth League (KISZ); Istvan Sarlos, secretary general of the PPF; and Miklos Ovari, MSZMP secretary in charge of agitprop activities. The present ambassador to the GDR, Andras Gyenes, was added to the six-member party Secretariat.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS Unlike Giersek, Honecker, Husak, and Zhivkov, who followed him to the rostrum, Kadar did not explicitly praise Brezhnev as the leader of detente, praising instead the "joint" efforts of the USSR and the socialist countries in implementing the 24th CPSU Congress' peace program. He hailed the Soviet leader, however, in the context of Soviet-Hungarian relations, recalling the 1972 visit to Budapest of "our people's true friend, Comrade Brezhnev." In underscoring the closeness of Soviet-Hungarian economic ties, Kadar went so far as to thank Brezhnev for Soviet policy in the sensitive area of fuel prices, despite the fact that prices of Soviet oil sold to Moscow's East European allies had recently been raised for 1975 and for the 1976-80 period. Kadar expressed "sincere thanks to Comrade Leonid Ilich Brezhnev" and the Soviet party and government for their "understanding and helpfulness" in aiding the Hungarians in overcoming their difficulties caused by the rise in world market prices and in solving their energy supply problems.

Kadar, in his main congress speech, alluded specifically to fruitfully developing relations between Hungary and 11 other socialist countries, including Romania and Yugoslavia. As in the past, he also declared Budapest's readiness to develop interstate relations with the PRC and Albania, "on the basis of equality and correct methods." His denunciation of the Chinese, elsewhere in his speech, was echoed by the other orthodox East European party leaders and by the MPR's McLomjants, all of whom joined him in endorsing a conference of European communist parties and/or a world party conference.

The congress speeches by other Hungarian party figures included a strikingly transparent criticism of the Romanians by MSZMP Politburo member Dezso Nemes on the 20th. In the prerelease carried by the MTI domestic service on the 19th, Nemes followed up a tribute to Brezhnev's role in detente with the statement:

If a policy of distancing oneself from the CPSU or the Soviet Union or even of open or concealed anti-Sovietism gains ground in the leadership of a workers party or government of a socialist country, it can easily become the puppet of various anti-Soviet forces and imperialist maneuvers.

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The speech by Romanian party representative Verdet at the congress on the 19th contained references to such standard Bucharest tenets as independence and sovereignty and cooperation with "all" socialist countries and communist parties. In addition to the barb at the Romanians, Nemes' speech registered the lengthiest denunciation of the Chinese of any speech given at the Hungarian congress. Prior to delivering his speech on the 20th, Nemes had attended the independent-minded Italian CP's congress in Rome.

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CHINA

CADRES URGED TO MOVE CAUTIOUSLY ON IDEOLOGICAL INCENTIVES

A 21 March PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, entitled "Leading Cadres Should Take the Lead and Study Well," focused on the role of leading cadres in the current campaign to gradually shift from a system of material production incentives to reliance solely on ideological incentives to speed China's economic development. The editorial instructed cadres to avoid hasty actions--implicitly those which might seek to impose restraints too quickly on material production incentives and thereby threaten political order and China's ambitious economic plans--and stressed the primary task of correctly understanding central instructions on carrying out the proletarian dictatorship campaign. The editorial warned: "It is essential to have a deep understanding of Chairman Mao's instructions and know exactly what he means," an implicit signal to cadres to proceed carefully in mobilizing the masses to work harder and increase production without any corresponding increase in their personal income. Pointing out that leading cadres must "be clear about such questions as commodities, money and distribution according to work in a socialist society," the editorial argued that if leading cadres deepened their study of theoretical issues, they would avoid being "duped and misled in the ...two-line struggle to come" and would be able to help "promote production" and "enhance stability and unity throughout the country."

The editorial's call for cadres to guard against excessive haste and over-zealousness in removing material incentives and other remaining "bourgeois rights" may have been triggered by a concern for an apparent slackening of production effort in some areas of China. For example, a 22 March Tsinan broadcast of an unusually frank speech by Shantung party leader Su I-jan at a recent meeting on following the theoretical road of the model Taching oil field contained a strong call for deepening the study of Mao's works as a means to meet labor quotas. Using firm language to argue that "discipline is the guarantee for implementing the line," Su declared that "it is essential to demand strict labor discipline, set up a strict system of appraising the diligence of workers, and set labor quotas to increase labor productivity." Su quoted Lenin at length in arguing that it was necessary "to set labor quotas and fulfill them without fail," and that those who "disobey the command and order and shirk work" must be punished "harshly," as "any lenient attitude and any soft and weak

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treatment would mean a crime against revolution." While Su stated that most leading industrial groups in Shantung are "good and can unite...to lead the masses to make great efforts and bring about quick results," he indicated that some leading cadres were in trouble, warning that "the mentality of a few leading comrades and the demand of continued revolution do not match."

Pointing a critical finger at cadres responsible for transportation work in Shantung, Su urged greater efforts to "promptly deliver to the production front materials which lie idle in warehouses." He also called upon railway transport departments and local party leaders to "mobilize the masses to further develop railway transport and to insure maximum safety and smooth movement of rail traffic." To help overcome these production problems, Su instructed local party committees to pay particular attention "to educating young workers so that they can combat erosion by bourgeois ideology" and to deepen their study of Mao's works in order to "consciously maintain the centrality and unity of the party, implement its decisions, obey its leadership, and insure that its line, principles and policies are carried out."

In an apparent effort to insure that local cadres do not overstep the central guidelines on the proletarian dictatorship campaign, provincial radios continue to broadcast reports explaining the campaign's scope and making it clear that the call to restrict "bourgeois rights" must not result in dislocation of the economic base. Chengchow radio on 24 March broadcast a signed commentary which gave some idea of the length and nature of the campaign, revealing that theoretical study is to be "the general program of the whole year's work," and that "the year of 1975 is a year of stability and unity." Pointing up the key words characterizing the campaign thus far, the commentary stressed that "through study, we must establish the viewpoint of the overall situation and spontaneously talk about the overall situation, party spirit, unity and discipline." Indicating that a disruptive mass movement from below would be undesirable, the commentary instructed local party committees to "adopt resolute measures to overcome interference from bourgeois factionalism" and to "struggle against all criminal acts sabotaging order in society."

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NOTES

MOSCOW ON PORTUGUESE PORT FACILITIES: A casual remark by a Moscow commentator has seemingly confirmed--albeit indirectly and belatedly--that the Soviet Union has in fact asked for permission to allow Soviet fishing trawlers to refuel at the Portuguese island of Madeira in the Atlantic. Four days after the abortive rightwing coup on 11 March, a Portuguese Government official announced that a private Portuguese transport company had requested government permission to allow Soviet merchant ships to use the Madeira refueling facilities. Moscow ignored the report until 23 March, when IZVESTIYA's foreign affairs editor Albert Grigoryants, participating in Moscow radio's weekly international observers roundtable, briefly mentioned Madeira in the course of lashing out at a Western "propaganda rumpus" about developments in Portugal. Ridiculing Western press "nonsense" such as the charge that Lisbon was "being drawn into the Communist orbit," Grigoryants declared without elaboration: "The opportunity for Soviet fishing trawlers to refuel at the island of Madeira is transformed by the pens of some zealous Western journalists into a threat of the creation of a Soviet military base on the island." In early February Moscow had scotched similar rumors through the usual device of publicizing a denial by the concerned country. Thus, Moscow radio and TASS had promptly reported a Portuguese Foreign Ministry denial of allegations in the Western press that the USSR had asked permission for its fishing fleet "to call at Portuguese ports," noting that Lisbon described such reports as "totally unfounded." The Soviet accounts in February left it unclear whether the issue was the use of port facilities or the more permanent establishment of "bases" for the Soviet fishing fleet.

CASTRO ON U.S. POLICY: In his first public reference to Secretary Kissinger's 1 March Houston speech which foresaw a new direction in U.S.-Cuban relations, Prime Minister Fidel Castro told Canadian reporters in Havana that "we consider Dr. Kissinger's recent statements on Cuba as positive." In an apparently brief and informal interview--reported by Montreal radio's international service on 21 March--Castro cited Kissinger's remarks as one of several signs of "a certain lessening of tension" between the two nations, but he added that "there still hasn't been much progress" along these lines. Castro also said that U.S. recognition of his government would be "a positive event." But he maintained, as he has before, that Cuba was "really not impatient" because recognition would come "sooner or

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later." In his first known comment on recent U.S. press reports of an alleged CIA plan to assassinate him, Castro said that he "was aware" that "a number of plans" for his assassination had been organized, and observed that their failure "shows a certain inefficiency on the part of the CIA."

PEKING ON SOVIET LEADERSHIP DISPUTE: For the first time in several years Peking has commented on alleged top-level Soviet leadership disagreements, claiming that Brezhnev and Kosygin are split on the issue of Soviet agricultural policy. The Chinese charge, which appears to be in response to repeated Soviet articles raising allegations about leadership "disputes" in Peking, was contained in a lengthy 21 March NCNA critique of Brezhnev's personal leadership in Soviet agricultural policy over the past decade. The article claimed that "the Soviet revisionist ruling clique is arguing fiercely over agricultural policy" and that Brezhnev's agricultural policy has recently come "under fire." It characterized Kosygin as dissatisfied with Brezhnev's work, citing as evidence remarks in Kosygin's 2 November 1974 speech at Kirgiz republic's 50th anniversary celebrations about "agricultural backwardness," and alleged that speeches by other Soviet officials at the December 1974 Supreme Soviet session also made veiled criticism of shortcomings in Brezhnev's agricultural leadership. Such specific NCNA criticism raising allegations of factionalism in Moscow contrasts with NCNA's 5 February 1973 response to the major shakeup in the Soviet leadership over agriculture policy--including the demotion of Politburo member Polyanskiy to head the ministry of agriculture and the dismissal of V.V. Matskevich from that post--following the poor Soviet harvest of 1972. Peking did not allude to Kremlin factionalism but characterized the leadership changes merely as a "trick" by the "Brezhnev clique" to "use scapegoats" to absolve the top leaders of responsibility for the agricultural setbacks.

CHINESE MASS ORGANIZATIONS: NCNA reported on 20 March that preparatory meetings had been held in Peking from 26 February to 20 March on the rebuilding of central leadership organs for three PRC mass organizations shattered in the cultural revolution--the All-China Trade Union, the Communist Youth League and the National Women's Congress. The meetings discussed revising the constitutions of the three organizations and called for holding separate national congresses at some time in the future to "set up their national leading bodies after due preparations." Provincial rebuilding of the three mass organizations has been underway since 1973, but reorganization at the national level apparently was slowed by the revolutionary

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excesses which marked the campaign against Confucius and Lin Biao one year ago. By setting up national leadership for the organizations now, Peking would be able to exercise greater central control over youth and workers, two key elements in the current ideological campaign to improve discipline and prevent factional disputes from causing economic disruption and production shortfalls. Reflecting these objectives, NCNA reported that the preparatory meetings had called upon the cadres of all three organizations to "promote stability and unity" and to greet the forthcoming national congresses with "a new upsurge of the national economy."

BIJEDIC VISIT TO U.S.: Belgrade comment on Yugoslav Premier Bijedic's 18-23 March visit to the United States expressed strong satisfaction with the steady development of U.S.-Yugoslav relations, placing particular stress on economic cooperation. Bijedic, who had met with President Ford and other high-level government officials, singled out as especially significant his talks with U.S. businessmen, which he described as "very satisfactory." Bijedic also indicated that he expected his visit to lead to a "considerable" increase in economic cooperation between the two countries. This contrasts with the tone of Yugoslav comment at the time of Tito's visit in October 1971, when the Yugoslav media decried the existing imbalance of trade favoring the United States and spelled out Belgrade's insistence on greater U.S. economic investment in Yugoslavia as a foundation for stronger political relations and as a "guarantee" for their reliability. Commenting on Bijedic's visit, TANJUG's diplomatic editor Budimir on the 17th hailed as "highly satisfactory" the development of economic cooperation over the past few years as well as the more favorable trade balance as proof of the "stability and long-range nature" of U.S.-Yugoslav relations. As to difficulties between the two countries, several articles denounced the criticism emanating from the United States of Belgrade's current domestic and foreign policies but were careful to point out that such criticism did not reflect the official U.S. position. Zagreb commentator Sundic on the 17th for example, held that bilateral relations must not be affected by anti-regime emigres in the United States or by the distortions of a critical press. And a TANJUG dispatch on the 21st, citing official Yugoslav sources, indicated hope that Washington's reaffirmation of the basic principles of relations between the two countries would "check the influence" of anti-regime critics who "through the press in the United States" have tried to disrupt U.S.-Yugoslav relations.

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SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE

END OF STATE FARM MINISTRIES ACCORDS WITH BREZHNEV POLICY

Since December, two of the five republic-level ministries for sovkhoses, established in 1970-72, have been merged back into the agricultural ministries, a move that accords with Brezhnev's position and seems to be a defeat for longtime agricultural supervisor Polyanskiy. While Brezhnev has campaigned to bring kolkhozes and sovkhoses closer together in new interfarm associations, Polyanskiy has appeared to prefer separate sovkhos and kolkhoz systems divorced from the agriculture ministry. Although he was demoted from first deputy premier to agriculture minister in early 1973, his influence has persisted, apparently accounting for some of the indecision and contradictory trends in agricultural policy. The abolition of the sovkhos ministries may signal the defeat of the Polyanskiy faction's viewpoint and the development of a more consistent and clear direction for Soviet agriculture.

MINISTRIES MERGED The abolition of the sovkhos ministries began with the 26 December 1974 ZARYA VOSTOKA announcement of the Georgian ministry's merger and was continued by the RSFSR ministry merger announced in the 19 March 1975 SOVIET RUSSIA. The RSFSR Ministry for Sovkhoses has been the most important and controversial such ministry, and its demise clearly suggests that the Azerbaydzhan, Uzbek and perhaps even Ukrainian ministries will soon follow suit.

The establishment of ministries for sovkhoses began with a Ukrainian republic ministry in March 1969 but spread to other republics slowly, with union-republic ministries created in Azerbaydzhan in August 1970, in Georgia in December 1970, Uzbekistan in January 1971 and the RSFSR in February 1972. Since there was no USSR Ministry for Sovkhoses, these republic ministries were put under the jurisdiction of the USSR Agriculture Ministry. It is not clear whether there had been any intent to create a USSR ministry, but in any case the movement to create republic ministries fizzled by 1973 and criticism of the new ministries began to appear.

The creation of sovkhos ministries brought extensive administrative changes, most notably the creation of a system of local sovkhos trusts. This soon led to charges that separate systems for sovkhoses and kolkhozes were being created, erecting administrative

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barriers which hampered agricultural planning and management. Estonian university professor and agricultural spokesman M. Bronshteyn made the most direct attack on this separation in the October 1973 QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS and 29 June 1974 IZVESTIYA, and he emphasized that Estonia was keeping its sovkhoses and kolkhozes together under the republic agriculture ministry. A 23 January 1974 IZVESTIYA article complained that Ukrainian sovkhoses and kolkhozes were finding it difficult to establish joint projects because of the existence of two separate ministries. S. Semin complained in the December 1974 ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE that the recent separation of sovkhos and kolkhoz administration had weakened agricultural leadership, especially at the rayon level. The sharpest attack came from noted economist I. Buzdalov in the December 1974 QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS. He charged that the establishment of the five sovkhos ministries had intensified barriers between sovkhoses and kolkhozes and was blocking the creation of the joint kolkhoz-sovkhos agro-industrial associations urged by Brezhnev at the December 1973 Central Committee plenum. As an example, he complained that in the Ukraine--where most farms are kolkhozes--the republic's 214 agro-industrial associations included only 8 kolkhozes as members. He also assailed the proliferation of ministries in the agricultural sector for causing duplication and lack of coordination.

POLYANSKIY VS. BREZHNEV The idea of dividing sovkhoses and kolkhozes into separate systems appears to have had the support of Polyanskiy, the longtime agricultural supervisor, and agriculture's top representative in planning, Gosplan First Deputy Chairman T.I. Sokolov--but not of Brezhnev. The position of Sokolov, like Polyanskiy a longtime advocate of more resources for agriculture, is clear. In a June 1972 PLANNED ECONOMY article he gave a ringing endorsement to the five new sovkhos ministries, disparaged the agriculture ministry as incapable of managing both sovkhoses and kolkhozes, and urged transfer of administrative powers to kolkhoz councils, as was soon done in Moldavia.

Polyanskiy's position on the desirability of a separate administrative system for sovkhoses is more elusive, but can probably be deduced from his enthusiasm for an independent kolkhoz system and from his hostility to the idea of giving the agriculture ministry broad administrative powers. The creation of sovkhos ministries in the five republics removed sovkhoses from the control of local agriculture ministries, while Moldavia's transfer of kolkhoz management to elected kolkhoz councils in early 1973 stripped the local

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agriculture ministry of control over kolkhozes. Nationwide extension of these trends would have reduced the agriculture ministry to supervision of livestock breeding, seed raising, science and training--as it had been under Khrushchev from 1961 to 1964. This would appear agreeable to Polyanskiy, who as far back as 1959 had urged administration of kolkhozes by elective kolkhoz organs and weakening of the agriculture ministry.

Polyanskiy has apparently retained his 1959 viewpoint, since immediately after becoming USSR Agriculture Minister in early 1973 (as well as chairman of the USSR Council of Kolkhozes) he emphasized the importance of Moldavia's experiment at a 5 March 1973 meeting of the council of kolkhozes. More recently, he lauded Moldavia for transferring planning and administration of kolkhozes to kolkhoz councils, at a 14 March 1975 session of the same council. In the latter speech, reported in the 15 March 1975 RURAL LIFE, Polyanskiy also praised the Ukrainian Council of Kolkhozes for taking over supervision of interkolkhoz organizations, and declared that kolkhoz councils should have "in essence, the leading role in developing interfarm cooperation." Earlier, in March 1974, Polyanskiy's USSR Council of Kolkhozes had recommended that other republics follow the Ukrainian council's example of taking over management of interkolkhoz organizations. In addition, it was probably more than coincidental that the RSFSR Ministry for Sovkhozes was created shortly after Polyanskiy's rival Voronov was ousted as RSFSR Premier in mid-1971 and that no sovkhov ministries have been created since Polyanskiy's early 1973 demotion.

On the other hand, Brezhnev, though long sympathetic to a system of elected kolkhoz councils, now appears more concerned about bringing kolkhozes and sovkhozes closer together, in particular, to pool their resources to finance construction of large modern livestock complexes. Although the Moldavians and others have claimed that Brezhnev endorsed the Moldavian experiment in his December 1973 Central Committee plenum speech, when excerpts from the speech were eventually published in a 1974 collection of his speeches it became clear Brezhnev had given the Moldavian approach only fleeting and noncommittal praise, while focusing more attention on the approach of the Tambov leaders, who have been forming joint sovkhov-kolkhoz associations. Moldavia was commended for "useful experience" along the eight oblasts, but Brezhnev devoted a whole paragraph to praising the work of Tambov oblast and its First Secretary V.I. Chernyy. Tambov's approach runs counter to that of the RSFSR Sovkhov Ministry, and publicity has compared the results of the sovkhov ministry's trusts unfavorably with that of Tambov's joint

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associations.* In addition, Brezhnev's plenum statements on interfarm associations emphasized the goal of bringing sovkhoses and kolkhozes closer together.

Although the Moldavian approach thus does not appear wholly approved by Brezhnev, publicity and praise for Moldavia's work have been continuing and there has been little criticism. In fact, it has been the Tambov leaders who are currently undergoing a verbal beating. A CPSU Central Committee decree printed in the 28 February 1975 PRAVDA censured the oblast leaders in remarkably harsh terms for poor leadership, although it did not criticize Tambov's agricultural innovations. A subsequent obkom plenum censured all the oblast leaders by name, and the oblast has now been held up as a bad example for the whole country, as local plenums in other areas have begun discussing the decree on Tambov.

Nevertheless, the Moldavians who have largely established two separate sectors--an interkolkhoz sector run by kolkhoz councils and an agro-industrial sector consisting of sovkhoses and processing plants--have had to tackle the problem of attempting some integration. At a May 1974 Kishinev conference reported in the September 1974 ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE, it was admitted that the participation of kolkhozes in agro-industrial associations was still an "unresolved question," since the kolkhozes' elective form of leadership might suffer if put under non-elective executive direction of the agro-industrial associations.

Others have also been raising this question. Legal expert M. Kozyr wrote in the 24 October 1974 RURAL LIFE that while sovkhoses could join sovkhos-kolkhoz associations, kolkhozes have no legal basis for joining agro-industrial associations under a ministry for sovkhoses or ministry for the food industry. In a September 1974 KOMMUNIST, Krasnodar First Secretary S.F. Medunov, an old associate of Polyanskiy, complained that agricultural writers were good at writing about the need for integrating kolkhozes into joint enterprises with the state but had little to say about how to actually do this in practice.

POLYANSKIY STATUS The status indicators regarding Polyanskiy's position in the leadership point both ways. Polyanskiy remains high in Politburo lineups and continues very active in agricultural affairs, yet he has been virtually snubbed

* For background on the Tambov system, see the TRENDS of 13 March 1974, pages 15-16.

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in the current celebration of the 10th anniversary of the March 1965 Central Committee plenum on agriculture. The anniversary of this plenum, the one which unveiled the post-Khrushchev agricultural program, has been celebrated in numerous press articles as well as by publication of a special book--all of which clearly shortchange Polyanskiy, who has been the Politburo's agricultural specialist during this entire period. Polyanskiy is ignored in the articles and, to judge from the book reviews, also in the book. The book's main article was written by Central Committee Secretary Kulakov, who has displaced Polyanskiy as the Politburo's new supervisor of agriculture, and includes articles by numerous officials high and low, such as Minister of Land Reclamation and Water Resources Ye. Ye. Alekseyevskiy, Minister of Procurement G.S. Zolotukhin, and Gosplan First Deputy Chairman T.I. Sokolov. The reviews do not mention any article by Agriculture Minister Polyanskiy, however. What is more, the Kulakov article summing up the agricultural achievements of the past decade was reprinted in the latest issue of KOMMUNIST. When the anniversary ceremony was held on 24 March, Kulakov delivered the main report, and others, such as Belorussian First Secretary Masherov and Moldavian First Secretary Bodyul spoke--but not Polyanskiy.

Nevertheless, Polyanskiy's grip on the agriculture ministry and the kolkhoz council system appears as firm as ever. The election of new councils of kolkhozes has just been completed, with Polyanskiy reelected as chairman of the USSR council. In addition, while Polyanskiy probably favored the creation of sovkhos ministries while he was first deputy premier in charge of all agricultural organs prior to 1973, the abolition of these ministries and restoration of sovkhos to local agriculture ministries may slightly augment his present authority as agriculture minister--although the sovkhos ministries themselves were already subject to the USSR Agriculture Minister.

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A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 17 - 23 MARCH 1975

<u>Moscow (2459 items)</u>			<u>Peking (967 items)</u>		
Hungarian Socialist Workers Party 11th Congress	(1%)	15%	Cambodia [NUFC Fifth Anniversary	(6%)	14%
[Brezhnev Speech in Budapest	(--)	4%]	UN Industrial Development Organization Meeting, Lima	(5%)	6%
Upcoming V-E Day 30th Anniversary	(11%)	7%	Guyana Prime Minister Burnham in PRC	(9%)	4%
Italian CP 14th Congress	(--)	6%	NPC Decision on Amnesty for "War Criminals"	(--)	3%
[Kirilenko Speeches in Italy	(--)	4%]	USSR Policy in Europe	(3%)	3%
China	(5%)	5%			
Gambia President Jawara in USSR	(--)	3%			
French Prime Minister Chirac in USSR	(--)	3%			
Cambodian Front, Fifth Anniversary	(--)	2%			

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.